The Truth will prevail, But only if we Demand it from Congress!
9-11 Inside Job and Neocons Hacked 2004
AlterNet
By Scott Ritter, Truthdig
Posted on July 30, 2008, Printed on July 30, 2008
http://www.alternet.org/story/93239/
The war between the United States and Iran is on. American taxpayer
dollars are being used, with the permission of Congress, to fund
activities that result in Iranians being killed and wounded, and
Iranian property destroyed. This wanton violation of a nation's
sovereignty would not be tolerated if the tables were turned and
Americans were being subjected to Iranian-funded covert actions that
took the lives of Americans, on American soil, and destroyed
American property and livelihood. Many Americans remain unaware of
what is transpiring abroad in their name.
Many of those who are cognizant of these activities are supportive
of them, an outgrowth of misguided sentiment which holds Iran
accountable for a list of grievances used by the U.S. government to
justify the ongoing global war on terror. Iran, we are told, is not
just a nation pursuing nuclear weapons, but is the largest state
sponsor of terror in the world today.
Much of the information behind this is being promulgated by Israel,
which has a vested interest in seeing Iran neutralized as a
potential threat. But Israel is joined by another source, even more
puzzling in terms of its broad-based acceptance in the world of
American journalism: the Mujahadeen-e Khalk, or MEK, an Iranian
opposition group sworn to overthrow the theocracy in Tehran. The CIA
today provides material support to the actions of the MEK inside
Iran. The recent spate of explosions in Iran, including a
particularly devastating "accident" involving a military convoy
transporting ammunition in downtown Tehran, appears to be linked to
an MEK operation; its agents working inside munitions manufacturing
plants deliberately are committing acts of sabotage which lead to
such explosions. If CIA money and planning support are behind these
actions, the agency's backing constitutes nothing less than an act
of war on the part of the United States against Iran.
The MEK traces its roots back to the CIA-orchestrated overthrow of
the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeg. Formed
among students and intellectuals, the MEK emerged in the 1960s as a
serious threat to the reign of Reza Shah Pahlevi. Facing brutal
repression from the Shah's secret police, the SAVAK, the MEK became
expert at blending into Iranian society, forming a cellular
organizational structure which made it virtually impossible to
eradicate. The MEK membership also became adept at gaining access to
positions of sensitivity and authority. When the Shah was overthrown
in 1978, the MEK played a major role and for a while worked hand in
glove with the Islamic Revolution in crafting a post-Shah Iran. In
1979 the MEK had a central role in orchestrating the seizure of the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and holding 55 Americans hostage for 444
days.
However, relations between the MEK and the Islamic regime in Tehran
soured, and after the MEK staged a bloody coup attempt in 1981, all
ties were severed and the two sides engaged in a violent civil war.
Revolutionary Guard members who were active at that time have
acknowledged how difficult it was to fight the MEK. In the end,
massive acts of arbitrary arrest, torture and executions were
required to break the back of mainstream MEK activity in Iran,
although even the Revolutionary Guard today admits the MEK remains
active and is virtually impossible to completely eradicate.
It is this stubborn ability to survive and operate inside Iran, at a
time when no other intelligence service can establish and maintain a
meaningful agent network there, which makes the MEK such an asset to
nations such as the United States and Israel. The MEK is able to
provide some useful intelligence; however, its overall value as an
intelligence resource is negatively impacted by the fact that it is
the sole source of human intelligence in Iran. As such, the group
has taken to exaggerating and fabricating reports to serve its own
political agenda. In this way, there is little to differentiate the
MEK from another Middle Eastern expatriate opposition group, the
Iraqi National Congress, or INC, which infamously supplied
inaccurate intelligence to the United States and other governments
and helped influence the U.S. decision to invade Iraq and overthrow
Saddam Hussein. Today, the MEK sees itself in a similar role,
providing sole-sourced intelligence to the United States and Israel
in an effort to facilitate American military operations against Iran
and, eventually, to overthrow the Islamic regime in Tehran.
The current situation concerning the MEK would be laughable if it
were not for the violent reality of that organization's activities.
Upon its arrival in Iraq in 1986, the group was placed under the
control of Saddam Hussein's Mukhabarat, or intelligence service. The
MEK was a heavily militarized organization and in 1988 participated
in division-size military operations against Iran. The organization
represents no state and can be found on the U.S. State Department's
list of terrorist organizations, yet since the U.S. invasion of Iraq
in 2003, the MEK has been under the protection of the U.S. military.
Its fighters are even given "protected status" under the Geneva
Conventions. The MEK says its members in Iraq are refugees, not
terrorists. And yet one would be hard-pressed to find why the 1951
Geneva Convention on Refugees should confer refugee status on an
active paramilitary organization that uses "refugee camps" inside
Iraq as its bases.
The MEK is behind much of the intelligence being used by the
International Atomic Energy Agency in building its case that Iran
may be pursuing (or did in fact pursue in the past) a nuclear
weapons program. The complexity of the MEK-CIA relationship was
recently underscored by the agency's acquisition of a laptop
computer allegedly containing numerous secret documents pertaining
to an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Much has been made about this
computer and its contents. The United States has led the charge
against Iran within international diplomatic circles, citing the
laptop information as the primary source proving Iran's ongoing
involvement in clandestine nuclear weapons activity. Of course, the
information on the computer, being derived from questionable sources
(i.e., the MEK and the CIA, both sworn enemies of Iran) is
controversial and its veracity is questioned by many, including me.
Now, I have a simple solution to the issue of the laptop computer:
Give it the UNSCOM treatment. Assemble a team of CIA, FBI and
Defense Department forensic computer analysts and probe the
computer, byte by byte. Construct a chronological record of how and
when the data on the computer were assembled. Check the "logic" of
the data, making sure everything fits together in a manner
consistent with the computer's stated function and use. Tell us when
the computer was turned on and logged into and how it was used.
Then, with this complex usage template constructed, overlay the
various themes which have been derived from the computer's contents,
pertaining to projects, studies and other activities of interest.
One should be able to rapidly ascertain whether or not the computer
is truly a key piece of intelligence pertaining to Iran's nuclear
programs.
The fact that this computer is acknowledged as coming from the MEK
and the fact that a proper forensic investigation would probably
demonstrate the fabricated nature of the data contained are why the
U.S. government will never agree to such an investigation being
done. A prosecutor, when making a case of criminal action, must lay
out evidence in a simple, direct manner, allowing not only the judge
and jury to see it but also the accused. If the evidence is as
strong as the prosecutor maintains, it is usually bad news for the
defendant. However, if the defendant is able to demonstrate
inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the data being presented, then
the prosecution is the one in trouble. And if the defense is able to
demonstrate that the entire case is built upon fabricated evidence,
the case is generally thrown out. This, in short, is what should be
done with the IAEA's ongoing probe into allegations that Iran has
pursued nuclear weapons. The evidence used by the IAEA is unable to
withstand even the most rudimentary cross-examination. It is
speculative at best, and most probably fabricated. Iran has done the
right thing in refusing to legitimize this illegitimate source of
information.
A key question that must be asked is why, then, does the IAEA
continue to permit Olli Heinonen, the agency's Finnish deputy
director for safeguards and the IAEA official responsible for the
ongoing technical inspections in Iran, to wage his one-man campaign
on behalf of the United States, Britain and (indirectly) Israel
regarding allegations derived from sources of such questionable
veracity (the MEK-supplied laptop computer)? Moreover, why is such
an official given free rein to discuss such sensitive data with the
press, or with politically motivated outside agencies, in a manner
that results in questionable allegations appearing in the public
arena as unquestioned fact? Under normal circumstances, leaks of the
sort that have occurred regarding the ongoing investigation into
Iran's alleged past studies on nuclear weapons would be subjected to
a thorough investigation to determine the source and to ensure that
appropriate measures are taken to end them. And yet, in Vienna,
Heinonen's repeated transgressions are treated as a giant
"non-event," the 800-pound gorilla in the room that everyone
pretends isn't really there.
Heinonen has become the pro-war yin to the anti-confrontation yang
of his boss, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. Every time
ElBaradei releases the results of the IAEA probe of Iran, pointing
out that the IAEA can find no evidence of any past or present
nuclear weapons program, and that there is a full understanding of
Iran's controversial centrifuge-based enrichment program, Heinonen
throws a monkey wrench into the works. Well-publicized briefings are
given to IAEA-based diplomats. Mysteriously, leaks from undisclosed
sources occur. Heinonen's Finnish nationality serves as a flimsy
cover for neutrality that long ago disappeared. He is no longer
serving in the role as unbiased inspector, but rather a front for
the active pursuit of an American- and Israeli-inspired
disinformation campaign designed to keep alive the flimsy
allegations of a nonexistent Iranian nuclear weapons program in
order to justify the continued warlike stance taken by the U.S. and
Israel against Iran.
The fact that the IAEA is being used as a front to pursue this
blatantly anti-Iranian propaganda is a disservice to an organization
with a mission of vital world importance. The interjection of not
only the unverified (and unverifiable) MEK laptop computer data,
side by side with a newly placed emphasis on a document relating to
the forming of uranium metal into hemispheres of the kind useful in
a nuclear weapon, is an amateurish manipulation of data to achieve a
preordained outcome. Calling the Iranian possession of the
aforementioned document "alarming," Heinonen (and the media) skipped
past the history of the document, which, of course, has been well
explained by Iran previously as something the Pakistani nuclear
proliferator A.Q. Khan inserted on his own volition to a delivery of
documentation pertaining to centrifuges. Far from being a
"top-secret" document protected by Iran's security services, it was
discarded in a file of old material that Iran provided to the IAEA
inspectors. When the IAEA found the document, Iran allowed it to be
fully examined by the inspectors, and answered every question posed
by the IAEA about how the document came to be in Iran. For Heinonen
to call the document "alarming," at this late stage in the game, is
not only irresponsible but factually inaccurate, given the
definition of the word. The Iranian document in question is neither
a cause for alarm, seeing as it is not a source for any "sudden fear
brought on by the sense of danger," nor does it provide any "warning
of existing or approaching danger," unless one is speaking of the
danger of military action on the part of the United States derived
from Heinonen's unfortunate actions and choice of words.
Olli Heinonen might as well become a salaried member of the Bush
administration, since he is operating in lock step with the U.S.
government's objective of painting Iran as a threat worthy of
military action. Shortly after Heinonen's alarmist briefing in March
2008, the U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte, emerged to
announce, "As today's briefing showed us, there are strong reasons
to suspect that Iran was working covertly and deceitfully, at least
until recently, to build a bomb." Heinonen's briefing provided
nothing of the sort, being derived from an irrelevant document and a
laptop computer of questionable provenance. But that did not matter
to Schulte, who noted that "Iran has refused to explain or even
acknowledge past work on weaponization." Schulte did not bother to
note that it would be difficult for Iran to explain or acknowledge
that which it has not done. "This is particularly troubling,"
Schulte went on, "when combined with Iran's determined effort to
master the technology to enrich uranium." Why is this so troubling?
Because, as Schulte noted, "Uranium enrichment is not necessary for
Iran's civil program but it is necessary to produce the fissile
material that could be weaponized into a bomb."
This, of course, is the crux of the issue: Iran's ongoing enrichment
program. Not because it is illegal; Iran is permitted to enrich
uranium for peaceful purposes under Article IV of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Not again because Iran's centrifuge
program is operating in an undeclared, unmonitored fashion; the IAEA
had stated it has a full understanding of the scope and work of the
Iranian centrifuge enrichment program and that all associated
nuclear material is accounted for and safeguarded. The problem has
never been, and will never be, Iran's enrichment program. The
problem is American policy objectives of regime change in Iran,
pushed by a combination of American desires for global hegemony and
an activist Israeli agenda which seeks regional security, in
perpetuity, through military and economic supremacy. The specter of
nuclear enrichment is simply a vehicle for facilitating the larger
policy objectives. Olli Heinonen, and those who support and sustain
his work, must be aware of the larger geopolitical context of his
actions, which makes them all the more puzzling and contemptible.
A major culprit in this entire sordid affair is the mainstream
media. Displaying an almost uncanny inability to connect the dots,
the editors who run America's largest newspapers, and the producers
who put together America's biggest television news programs, have
collectively facilitated the most simplistic, inane and factually
unfounded story lines coming out of the Bush White House. The most
recent fairy tale was one of "diplomacy," on the part of one William
Burns, the No. 3 diplomat in the State Department.
I have studied the minutes of meetings involving John McCloy, an
American official who served numerous administrations, Democratic
and Republican alike, in the decades following the end of the Second
World War. His diplomacy with the Soviets, conducted with senior
Soviet negotiator Valerein Zorin and Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev himself, was real, genuine, direct and designed to
resolve differences. The transcripts of the diplomacy conducted
between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho to bring an end to the
Vietnam conflict is likewise a study in the give and take required
to achieve the status of real diplomacy.
Sending a relatively obscure official like Burns to "observe" a
meeting between the European Union and Iran, with instructions not
to interact, not to initiate, not to discuss, cannot under any
circumstances be construed as diplomacy. Any student of diplomatic
history could tell you this. And yet the esteemed editors and news
producers used the term diplomacy, without challenge or
clarification, to describe Burns' mission to Geneva on July 19. The
decision to send him there was hailed as a "significant concession"
on the part of the Bush administration, a step away from war and an
indication of a new desire within the White House to resolve the
Iranian impasse through diplomacy. How this was going to happen with
a diplomat hobbled and muzzled to the degree Burns was apparently
skipped the attention of these writers and their bosses. Diplomacy,
America was told, was the new policy option of choice for the Bush
administration.
Of course, the Geneva talks produced nothing. The United States had
made sure Europe, through its foreign policy chief, Javier Solana,
had no maneuvering room when it came to the core issue of uranium
enrichment: Iran must suspend all enrichment before any movement
could be made on any other issue. Furthermore, the American-backed
program of investigation concerning the MEK-supplied laptop computer
further poisoned the diplomatic waters. Iran, predictably, refused
to suspend its enrichment program, and rejected the Heinonen-led
investigation into nuclear weaponization, refusing to cooperate
further with the IAEA on that matter, noting that it fell outside
the scope of the IAEA's mandate in Iran.
Condoleezza Rice was quick to respond. After a debriefing from
Burns, who flew to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, where Rice was
holding closed-door meetings with the foreign ministers of six Arab
nations on the issue of Iran, Rice told the media that Iran "was not
serious" about resolving the standoff. Having played the diplomacy
card, Rice moved on with the real agenda: If Iran did not fully
cooperate with the international community (i.e., suspend its
enrichment program), then it would face a new round of economic
sanctions and undisclosed punitive measures, both unilaterally on
the part of the United States and Europe, as well as in the form of
even broader sanctions from the United Nations Security Council
(although it is doubtful that Russia and China would go along with
such a plan).
The issue of unilateral U.S. sanctions is most worrisome. Both the
House of Representatives, through HR 362, and the Senate, through SR
580, are preparing legislation that would call for an air, ground
and sea blockade of Iran. Back in October 1962, President John F.
Kennedy, when considering the imposition of a naval blockade against
Cuba in response to the presence of Soviet missiles in that nation,
opined that "a blockade is a major military operation, too. It's an
act of war." Which, of course, it is. The false diplomacy waged by
the White House in Geneva simply pre-empted any congressional call
for a diplomatic outreach. Now the president can move on with the
mission of facilitating a larger war with Iran by legitimizing yet
another act of aggression.
One day, in the not-so-distant future, Americans will awake to the
reality that American military forces are engaged in a shooting war
with Iran. Many will scratch their heads and wonder, "How did that
happen?" The answer is simple: We all let it happen. We are at war
with Iran right now. We just don't have the moral courage to admit
it.
Scott Ritter is a former U.N. weapons inspector and Marine
intelligence officer who has written extensively about Iran.
© 2008 Truthdig All rights reserved.
View this story online at: http://www.alternet.org/story/93239/
AlterNet
America Is Already Committing Acts of War Against Iran
By Scott Ritter, Truthdig
Posted on July 30, 2008, Printed on July 30, 2008
http://www.alternet.org/story/93239/
The war between the United States and Iran is on. American taxpayer
dollars are being used, with the permission of Congress, to fund
activities that result in Iranians being killed and wounded, and
Iranian property destroyed. This wanton violation of a nation's
sovereignty would not be tolerated if the tables were turned and
Americans were being subjected to Iranian-funded covert actions that
took the lives of Americans, on American soil, and destroyed
American property and livelihood. Many Americans remain unaware of
what is transpiring abroad in their name.
Many of those who are cognizant of these activities are supportive
of them, an outgrowth of misguided sentiment which holds Iran
accountable for a list of grievances used by the U.S. government to
justify the ongoing global war on terror. Iran, we are told, is not
just a nation pursuing nuclear weapons, but is the largest state
sponsor of terror in the world today.
Much of the information behind this is being promulgated by Israel,
which has a vested interest in seeing Iran neutralized as a
potential threat. But Israel is joined by another source, even more
puzzling in terms of its broad-based acceptance in the world of
American journalism: the Mujahadeen-e Khalk, or MEK, an Iranian
opposition group sworn to overthrow the theocracy in Tehran. The CIA
today provides material support to the actions of the MEK inside
Iran. The recent spate of explosions in Iran, including a
particularly devastating "accident" involving a military convoy
transporting ammunition in downtown Tehran, appears to be linked to
an MEK operation; its agents working inside munitions manufacturing
plants deliberately are committing acts of sabotage which lead to
such explosions. If CIA money and planning support are behind these
actions, the agency's backing constitutes nothing less than an act
of war on the part of the United States against Iran.
The MEK traces its roots back to the CIA-orchestrated overthrow of
the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeg. Formed
among students and intellectuals, the MEK emerged in the 1960s as a
serious threat to the reign of Reza Shah Pahlevi. Facing brutal
repression from the Shah's secret police, the SAVAK, the MEK became
expert at blending into Iranian society, forming a cellular
organizational structure which made it virtually impossible to
eradicate. The MEK membership also became adept at gaining access to
positions of sensitivity and authority. When the Shah was overthrown
in 1978, the MEK played a major role and for a while worked hand in
glove with the Islamic Revolution in crafting a post-Shah Iran. In
1979 the MEK had a central role in orchestrating the seizure of the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and holding 55 Americans hostage for 444
days.
However, relations between the MEK and the Islamic regime in Tehran
soured, and after the MEK staged a bloody coup attempt in 1981, all
ties were severed and the two sides engaged in a violent civil war.
Revolutionary Guard members who were active at that time have
acknowledged how difficult it was to fight the MEK. In the end,
massive acts of arbitrary arrest, torture and executions were
required to break the back of mainstream MEK activity in Iran,
although even the Revolutionary Guard today admits the MEK remains
active and is virtually impossible to completely eradicate.
It is this stubborn ability to survive and operate inside Iran, at a
time when no other intelligence service can establish and maintain a
meaningful agent network there, which makes the MEK such an asset to
nations such as the United States and Israel. The MEK is able to
provide some useful intelligence; however, its overall value as an
intelligence resource is negatively impacted by the fact that it is
the sole source of human intelligence in Iran. As such, the group
has taken to exaggerating and fabricating reports to serve its own
political agenda. In this way, there is little to differentiate the
MEK from another Middle Eastern expatriate opposition group, the
Iraqi National Congress, or INC, which infamously supplied
inaccurate intelligence to the United States and other governments
and helped influence the U.S. decision to invade Iraq and overthrow
Saddam Hussein. Today, the MEK sees itself in a similar role,
providing sole-sourced intelligence to the United States and Israel
in an effort to facilitate American military operations against Iran
and, eventually, to overthrow the Islamic regime in Tehran.
The current situation concerning the MEK would be laughable if it
were not for the violent reality of that organization's activities.
Upon its arrival in Iraq in 1986, the group was placed under the
control of Saddam Hussein's Mukhabarat, or intelligence service. The
MEK was a heavily militarized organization and in 1988 participated
in division-size military operations against Iran. The organization
represents no state and can be found on the U.S. State Department's
list of terrorist organizations, yet since the U.S. invasion of Iraq
in 2003, the MEK has been under the protection of the U.S. military.
Its fighters are even given "protected status" under the Geneva
Conventions. The MEK says its members in Iraq are refugees, not
terrorists. And yet one would be hard-pressed to find why the 1951
Geneva Convention on Refugees should confer refugee status on an
active paramilitary organization that uses "refugee camps" inside
Iraq as its bases.
The MEK is behind much of the intelligence being used by the
International Atomic Energy Agency in building its case that Iran
may be pursuing (or did in fact pursue in the past) a nuclear
weapons program. The complexity of the MEK-CIA relationship was
recently underscored by the agency's acquisition of a laptop
computer allegedly containing numerous secret documents pertaining
to an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Much has been made about this
computer and its contents. The United States has led the charge
against Iran within international diplomatic circles, citing the
laptop information as the primary source proving Iran's ongoing
involvement in clandestine nuclear weapons activity. Of course, the
information on the computer, being derived from questionable sources
(i.e., the MEK and the CIA, both sworn enemies of Iran) is
controversial and its veracity is questioned by many, including me.
Now, I have a simple solution to the issue of the laptop computer:
Give it the UNSCOM treatment. Assemble a team of CIA, FBI and
Defense Department forensic computer analysts and probe the
computer, byte by byte. Construct a chronological record of how and
when the data on the computer were assembled. Check the "logic" of
the data, making sure everything fits together in a manner
consistent with the computer's stated function and use. Tell us when
the computer was turned on and logged into and how it was used.
Then, with this complex usage template constructed, overlay the
various themes which have been derived from the computer's contents,
pertaining to projects, studies and other activities of interest.
One should be able to rapidly ascertain whether or not the computer
is truly a key piece of intelligence pertaining to Iran's nuclear
programs.
The fact that this computer is acknowledged as coming from the MEK
and the fact that a proper forensic investigation would probably
demonstrate the fabricated nature of the data contained are why the
U.S. government will never agree to such an investigation being
done. A prosecutor, when making a case of criminal action, must lay
out evidence in a simple, direct manner, allowing not only the judge
and jury to see it but also the accused. If the evidence is as
strong as the prosecutor maintains, it is usually bad news for the
defendant. However, if the defendant is able to demonstrate
inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the data being presented, then
the prosecution is the one in trouble. And if the defense is able to
demonstrate that the entire case is built upon fabricated evidence,
the case is generally thrown out. This, in short, is what should be
done with the IAEA's ongoing probe into allegations that Iran has
pursued nuclear weapons. The evidence used by the IAEA is unable to
withstand even the most rudimentary cross-examination. It is
speculative at best, and most probably fabricated. Iran has done the
right thing in refusing to legitimize this illegitimate source of
information.
A key question that must be asked is why, then, does the IAEA
continue to permit Olli Heinonen, the agency's Finnish deputy
director for safeguards and the IAEA official responsible for the
ongoing technical inspections in Iran, to wage his one-man campaign
on behalf of the United States, Britain and (indirectly) Israel
regarding allegations derived from sources of such questionable
veracity (the MEK-supplied laptop computer)? Moreover, why is such
an official given free rein to discuss such sensitive data with the
press, or with politically motivated outside agencies, in a manner
that results in questionable allegations appearing in the public
arena as unquestioned fact? Under normal circumstances, leaks of the
sort that have occurred regarding the ongoing investigation into
Iran's alleged past studies on nuclear weapons would be subjected to
a thorough investigation to determine the source and to ensure that
appropriate measures are taken to end them. And yet, in Vienna,
Heinonen's repeated transgressions are treated as a giant
"non-event," the 800-pound gorilla in the room that everyone
pretends isn't really there.
Heinonen has become the pro-war yin to the anti-confrontation yang
of his boss, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. Every time
ElBaradei releases the results of the IAEA probe of Iran, pointing
out that the IAEA can find no evidence of any past or present
nuclear weapons program, and that there is a full understanding of
Iran's controversial centrifuge-based enrichment program, Heinonen
throws a monkey wrench into the works. Well-publicized briefings are
given to IAEA-based diplomats. Mysteriously, leaks from undisclosed
sources occur. Heinonen's Finnish nationality serves as a flimsy
cover for neutrality that long ago disappeared. He is no longer
serving in the role as unbiased inspector, but rather a front for
the active pursuit of an American- and Israeli-inspired
disinformation campaign designed to keep alive the flimsy
allegations of a nonexistent Iranian nuclear weapons program in
order to justify the continued warlike stance taken by the U.S. and
Israel against Iran.
The fact that the IAEA is being used as a front to pursue this
blatantly anti-Iranian propaganda is a disservice to an organization
with a mission of vital world importance. The interjection of not
only the unverified (and unverifiable) MEK laptop computer data,
side by side with a newly placed emphasis on a document relating to
the forming of uranium metal into hemispheres of the kind useful in
a nuclear weapon, is an amateurish manipulation of data to achieve a
preordained outcome. Calling the Iranian possession of the
aforementioned document "alarming," Heinonen (and the media) skipped
past the history of the document, which, of course, has been well
explained by Iran previously as something the Pakistani nuclear
proliferator A.Q. Khan inserted on his own volition to a delivery of
documentation pertaining to centrifuges. Far from being a
"top-secret" document protected by Iran's security services, it was
discarded in a file of old material that Iran provided to the IAEA
inspectors. When the IAEA found the document, Iran allowed it to be
fully examined by the inspectors, and answered every question posed
by the IAEA about how the document came to be in Iran. For Heinonen
to call the document "alarming," at this late stage in the game, is
not only irresponsible but factually inaccurate, given the
definition of the word. The Iranian document in question is neither
a cause for alarm, seeing as it is not a source for any "sudden fear
brought on by the sense of danger," nor does it provide any "warning
of existing or approaching danger," unless one is speaking of the
danger of military action on the part of the United States derived
from Heinonen's unfortunate actions and choice of words.
Olli Heinonen might as well become a salaried member of the Bush
administration, since he is operating in lock step with the U.S.
government's objective of painting Iran as a threat worthy of
military action. Shortly after Heinonen's alarmist briefing in March
2008, the U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte, emerged to
announce, "As today's briefing showed us, there are strong reasons
to suspect that Iran was working covertly and deceitfully, at least
until recently, to build a bomb." Heinonen's briefing provided
nothing of the sort, being derived from an irrelevant document and a
laptop computer of questionable provenance. But that did not matter
to Schulte, who noted that "Iran has refused to explain or even
acknowledge past work on weaponization." Schulte did not bother to
note that it would be difficult for Iran to explain or acknowledge
that which it has not done. "This is particularly troubling,"
Schulte went on, "when combined with Iran's determined effort to
master the technology to enrich uranium." Why is this so troubling?
Because, as Schulte noted, "Uranium enrichment is not necessary for
Iran's civil program but it is necessary to produce the fissile
material that could be weaponized into a bomb."
This, of course, is the crux of the issue: Iran's ongoing enrichment
program. Not because it is illegal; Iran is permitted to enrich
uranium for peaceful purposes under Article IV of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Not again because Iran's centrifuge
program is operating in an undeclared, unmonitored fashion; the IAEA
had stated it has a full understanding of the scope and work of the
Iranian centrifuge enrichment program and that all associated
nuclear material is accounted for and safeguarded. The problem has
never been, and will never be, Iran's enrichment program. The
problem is American policy objectives of regime change in Iran,
pushed by a combination of American desires for global hegemony and
an activist Israeli agenda which seeks regional security, in
perpetuity, through military and economic supremacy. The specter of
nuclear enrichment is simply a vehicle for facilitating the larger
policy objectives. Olli Heinonen, and those who support and sustain
his work, must be aware of the larger geopolitical context of his
actions, which makes them all the more puzzling and contemptible.
A major culprit in this entire sordid affair is the mainstream
media. Displaying an almost uncanny inability to connect the dots,
the editors who run America's largest newspapers, and the producers
who put together America's biggest television news programs, have
collectively facilitated the most simplistic, inane and factually
unfounded story lines coming out of the Bush White House. The most
recent fairy tale was one of "diplomacy," on the part of one William
Burns, the No. 3 diplomat in the State Department.
I have studied the minutes of meetings involving John McCloy, an
American official who served numerous administrations, Democratic
and Republican alike, in the decades following the end of the Second
World War. His diplomacy with the Soviets, conducted with senior
Soviet negotiator Valerein Zorin and Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev himself, was real, genuine, direct and designed to
resolve differences. The transcripts of the diplomacy conducted
between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho to bring an end to the
Vietnam conflict is likewise a study in the give and take required
to achieve the status of real diplomacy.
Sending a relatively obscure official like Burns to "observe" a
meeting between the European Union and Iran, with instructions not
to interact, not to initiate, not to discuss, cannot under any
circumstances be construed as diplomacy. Any student of diplomatic
history could tell you this. And yet the esteemed editors and news
producers used the term diplomacy, without challenge or
clarification, to describe Burns' mission to Geneva on July 19. The
decision to send him there was hailed as a "significant concession"
on the part of the Bush administration, a step away from war and an
indication of a new desire within the White House to resolve the
Iranian impasse through diplomacy. How this was going to happen with
a diplomat hobbled and muzzled to the degree Burns was apparently
skipped the attention of these writers and their bosses. Diplomacy,
America was told, was the new policy option of choice for the Bush
administration.
Of course, the Geneva talks produced nothing. The United States had
made sure Europe, through its foreign policy chief, Javier Solana,
had no maneuvering room when it came to the core issue of uranium
enrichment: Iran must suspend all enrichment before any movement
could be made on any other issue. Furthermore, the American-backed
program of investigation concerning the MEK-supplied laptop computer
further poisoned the diplomatic waters. Iran, predictably, refused
to suspend its enrichment program, and rejected the Heinonen-led
investigation into nuclear weaponization, refusing to cooperate
further with the IAEA on that matter, noting that it fell outside
the scope of the IAEA's mandate in Iran.
Condoleezza Rice was quick to respond. After a debriefing from
Burns, who flew to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, where Rice was
holding closed-door meetings with the foreign ministers of six Arab
nations on the issue of Iran, Rice told the media that Iran "was not
serious" about resolving the standoff. Having played the diplomacy
card, Rice moved on with the real agenda: If Iran did not fully
cooperate with the international community (i.e., suspend its
enrichment program), then it would face a new round of economic
sanctions and undisclosed punitive measures, both unilaterally on
the part of the United States and Europe, as well as in the form of
even broader sanctions from the United Nations Security Council
(although it is doubtful that Russia and China would go along with
such a plan).
The issue of unilateral U.S. sanctions is most worrisome. Both the
House of Representatives, through HR 362, and the Senate, through SR
580, are preparing legislation that would call for an air, ground
and sea blockade of Iran. Back in October 1962, President John F.
Kennedy, when considering the imposition of a naval blockade against
Cuba in response to the presence of Soviet missiles in that nation,
opined that "a blockade is a major military operation, too. It's an
act of war." Which, of course, it is. The false diplomacy waged by
the White House in Geneva simply pre-empted any congressional call
for a diplomatic outreach. Now the president can move on with the
mission of facilitating a larger war with Iran by legitimizing yet
another act of aggression.
One day, in the not-so-distant future, Americans will awake to the
reality that American military forces are engaged in a shooting war
with Iran. Many will scratch their heads and wonder, "How did that
happen?" The answer is simple: We all let it happen. We are at war
with Iran right now. We just don't have the moral courage to admit
it.
Scott Ritter is a former U.N. weapons inspector and Marine
intelligence officer who has written extensively about Iran.
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